When Is a Fixed Sum Not a Fixed Sum but a Penalty Cause? by Zeller, Bruno
WHEN IS A FIXED SUM NOT A FIXED SUM BUT A PENALTY
CLAUSE?
Bruno Zeller*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Graves in his article Penalty Clauses and the CISG  provides1
a response to the view that penalty clauses are governed by the CISG.  He2
argues very powerfully that penalty clauses are not to be governed by the
CISG, as they do not overcome the Article 4 hurdles. Furthermore, he states
that the purpose of his article is “to explore and evaluate these newly
suggested rationalisations for diverging from the traditional view, as well as
the original basis and continuing vitality of the traditional view.”3
It should be noted that the CISG in its inception created a new approach
to contract law by formulating a uniform law that is not dependent on
domestic law. Article 7 and the Preamble clearly set out the aspirations and
functions of the CISG. However, at the same time it must also be recognised
that not all issues could be harmonised; hence there are gaps in the CISG that
must be filled by domestic law, but only as a last resort if a close reading
within the fours corners of the CISG do not offer a solution.
Therefore it is argued that whether a view is traditional or not is
irrelevant. The question at the heart of the problem is whether general
principles can cover a perceived gap and hence bring the issue within the
domain of the CISG.
This article restates the views that fixed sums whether penal or not are
governed by the CISG. It is admitted that Professor Graves does have some
valid arguments that are in parts convincing, but still does not negate the
issues at hand. It is argued that the argument in the end hinges on the position
one takes to view contractual obligations. In other words, it depends whether
* Dr. Bruno Zeller is an Associate Professor, Victoria University, Adjunct Professor, School of
Law, Murdoch University—Perth and an Associate, The Institute for Logistics and Supply Chain
Management, Victoria University Melbourne.
1. Jack Graves, Penalty Clauses and the CISG, 30 J.L. & COM. 153 (2012).
2. Bruno Zeller, Penalty Clauses: Are They Governed by the CISG?, 23 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1
(2011), available at http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol23/iss1/1.
3. Graves, supra note 1, at 156.
173
174 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 30:173
contracts are viewed from a “mercantile” rather than a “promissory”
perspective. The central question is whether the validity issue is determined
at the formation stage of a contract or when the contract is breached.
Professor Graves noted that the “‘validity exception’ of Article 4(a)” is
limited by its introductory clause “except as otherwise expressly provided in
this convention.”  However, even if there are issues that potentially could4
invoke Article 4, the “interpretation of validity is not initially a question of
domestic law.”  The CISG “dictates the understanding of validity in the5
international context of a transaction and detached from national perceptions
on the matter in order to avoid diverging results”  which are exhibited in the6
treatment of fixed sums. Common law and civil law approaches to fixed sums
are divergent and hence provide divergent results.
The desire to produce a harmonised law wherever possible is confirmed
by Article 7(1), which directs the reader to the interpretation ladder in order
to fill “internal gaps.” So far this author and Jack Graves are at idem. The
divergence of arguments is based on the fact that Graves argues that there is
“no functionally adequate solution” to the issue.  This argument is dependent7
on the fact that Article 6 cannot be invoked and hence Article 74 is applicable
in its entirety as well as the fact that Article 4 is applied at the point when a
party breaches the contract and not at the formation stage.
Two observations need to be made. First, the purpose of the CISG and
indeed any convention is to introduce a uniform law into areas which
otherwise are divergent. As it is noted, civil law countries do generally enforce
penalty clauses; hence Article 4 is not enlivened and the CISG will govern the
issue. In Australia, the issue is that penalty clauses are not enforceable and
hence arguably again do not touch upon Article 4. The situation in the U.S.
appears to be clear that penalty clauses are void; hence Article 4 could
potentially be brought into play. It is therefore obvious that depending on the
conflict of law rules in some circumstances the CISG will govern the issue
whereas especially in U.S. jurisdictions the issue of validity needs to be
tackled. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of this issue is varied. It is not
surprising that in civil law countries the inclusion of a fixed sum that might
be penal in nature is considered to be part of the CISG. Of special interest are
4. Id. at 157.
5. Milena Djordjevic, Article 4, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 62, 69 (Stefan Kröll et al. eds., 2011).
6. Id. at 68.
7. Graves, supra note 1, at 161–62.
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recent decisions of courts in the Balkans. In the Trolleybus Case the Tribunal
noted:
When deciding on [Buyer]’s claim for contractual penalty, the Tribunal took into
consideration that the purpose of this penalty is to give an advance assessment of the
amount of the damages for breach of contract. In other words, the creditor does not have
to prove the existence of loss and its amount but only that the debtor failed to fulfil its
obligation.8
Furthermore, the Tribunal in the Milk Packaging Equipment Case stated
clearly:
The Vienna Convention does not deal with the question of validity of the provision on
liquidated damages, which are requested by the [Seller]; however, in accordance with the
principle of party autonomy (Article 6 of the Convention), it is undisputed that the
Convention allows the parties to freely determine the amount of compensation to be paid
by the debtor to the creditor in case of non-performance or untimely performance of a
contractual obligation.9
In sum it has been argued that:
It is evident from the rationales of these awards that agreeing to contractual penalties
provisions had the sole purpose of estimating future damages and that the tribunals
showed willingness to uphold such clauses where this was the case.10
Considering that the purpose of the CISG is to harmonise international
sales laws, the issue of fixed sums is a prime example where a careful analysis
is warranted in order to clarify and unify the law on this particular issue.
The second observation is that freedom of contract is a principle common
to most if not all legal systems; hence it might be classed as a “sacred cow.”
Because these two principles, freedom of contract and harmonisation of laws,
are of “primary” importance, it is argued that the CISG needs to be viewed
from a global point of view as contained in Article 7. This requires a detailed
examination of the CISG in order to point to a general principle that governs
the issue at hand, namely the inclusion of fixed sum clauses. Because the
8. Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, Serbia,
30 Oct. 2006, at § VII, para. 8.3, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061030sb.html.
9. Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration attached to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, Serbia,
15 July 2008, at § 6, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080715sb.html.
10. Milena Djordjevic & Vladimir Pavic, The CISG in the Balkans, paper presented at the
University of Florida Center for International Business Education & Research/Warrington College of
Business Administration Conference: Global Challenges of International Sales Law (November 11–12,
2011) (on file with author).
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diplomatic conference did not find commonality, they deferred the issue of
penalty clause expressed as a fixed sum to Article 4, the validity article, as
there is no direct reference within the CISG in relation to penalty clauses. On
this point, the opinions of this author and Professor Graves are not divergent.
There is no argument that a fixed sum (liquidated damages) is governed
by the CISG. The real argument boils down to one question: when does a
fixed sum become a penalty clause and cease to be a fixed sum and hence
could be governed by domestic law or as it is argued in this article is still
governed by the CISG? Simply put, parties in most cases will only be able to
make a distinction between a fixed sum and a penalty clause once the contract
is broken. It can be argued therefore that from a theoretical point of view the
tenets of the economic analysis of law are helpful as they indicate that rational
contracting parties will negotiate efficient contract terms,  which suggests11
that parties do understand their obligations when agreeing on a fixed sum. As
there is agreement it follows that courts ought to uphold the bargains entered
into by contractual parties.
This article will provide arguments to support the contention that the
CISG includes a general principle that allows the inclusion of fixed sums into
the sphere of the CISG without enlivening Article 4. In order to overcome the
argument of Professor Graves, two hurdles need to be overcome.
First, there is an argument that would suggest that a clause once valid and
governed by the CISG cannot become invalid as the time of determination as
to its validity remains at the time of conclusion of the contract. The second
point is whether Article 6 is to be enlivened before Article 4 becomes an issue.
The point is that—as the fixed sum is included into the contract—the validity
issue is not enlivened; hence a partial or total deviation from the CISG is
operational. Simply put, only upon breach or after the breach does it become
obvious that the fixed sum is a “liquidated sum” or a penalty clause. Hence the
question can be rephrased as: at what stage of the contractual relationship is
the determinative point to see whether a validity issue arises?
FIRST ARGUMENT
The following situations need to be explored in order to fully understand
the interplay of general principles and provisions of the CISG. First, a fixed
sum included in the contract is below or at the actual amount of damages.
11. Larry A. Dimatteo & Daniel T. Ostas, Comparative Efficiency in International Sales Law, 26
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 371, 395 (2011).
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Secondly, a fixed sum, though judged to be equal to or below the actual
damages at the formation of the contract, proves to be too high at the breach
of the contract and could not be termed penal in nature.
It is uncontested that parties to a contract can “derogate from or vary the
effects of any of its provisions.”  If a party included a fixed sum into a12
contract as being the totality of damages, which are due in case of a breach of
contract, the matter would be governed by the CISG. The main argument
would hinge on Article 74, as damages consist of a “sum equal to the loss
including loss of profit suffered by the other party.” The argument of the
breaching party is simple. They would argue that by including a fixed sum the
parties have derogated from the CISG, namely Article 74. In effect they have
fixed a sum, which described the amount that can be claimed as damage. If the
fixed sum is less or the same as the actual loss, the argument stands
uncontested as there is no validity issue in any legal system. The contract has
allocated the damages and the only question is whether a party that
underestimated the losses can claim the difference under the CISG. It is
argued that the party suffering the loss cannot claim any extra damages,
otherwise freedom of contract, which is implied in Article 6 of the CISG,
would be violated.
After all, a contractual clause is always upheld unless it is in breach of a
mandatory law, hence derogation is not possible. Article 74 does indicate that
damages need to be “equal”  to the loss and importantly in sentence two the13
restriction is that it cannot “exceed the loss which the party in breach
foresaw.”  Arguably sentence one needs to be read first which indicates that14
the sum needs to be equal to the loss but by including a fixed sum, Article 74
has been derogated from. The question is whether the contractual term
derogated the whole of Article 74 or only parts thereof. The answer is
obviously that sentence one has only been replaced via Article 6 by a
contractual term. The fixed sum not being a penalty clause does not enliven
Article 4 even taking Professor Graves’s arguments into consideration. It is
therefore inconceivable that a court would change or vary a clause as
“performance would be so radically changed as to amount to the performance
of an obligation quite different from that contemplated by the contract.”15
12. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 6, U.N. Doc.
A/CONG.97/18, Annex 1 (Apr. 11, 1980) [hereinafter CISG].
13. CISG art. 74.
14. Id.
15. Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law—The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods 104 (Manz 1986), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
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Professor Graves argues that using sentence two only amounts “to the use
of the tail (foreseeability) to wag the dog (compensation for the aggrieved
party’s expectation damages). Instead one should begin any analysis of Article
74 with its first sentence.”  It needs to be noted again that at the formation of16
the contract Article 6 in effect varied Article 74 by replacing sentence one
with a fixed sum. If Professor Graves’s argument is correct then it would only
be relevant if Article 4, at the time of the breach, is superior to Article 6.
However, this argument presupposes the fact that at the formation of the
contract the validly clause has been operative, that is, there is no functionally
equivalent solution within the CISG. To invoke Article 4 just because the
contract contains a fixed sum would mean that not only is Article 6 relegated
but also that Article 4 now replaces a functionally equivalent solution, which
pursuant to Article 7(1) would replace the operation of Article 4. Besides, to
ask for a lesser sum as damages does not enliven an argument of validity.
Simply put, the interpretation of the interplay between Article 6 and 74
is illustrated by the fact that if a fixed sum is less than the actual damages, the
party who suffers the loss cannot rely on Article 74 first sentence, as it is now
replaced by the contractual clause. Sentence two illustrates that the damages
“may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have
foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract.” The breaching party is
only liable for the damages they foresaw at the conclusion of the contract,
which is the fixed amount and not the damages which can eventuate at the
time of the breach of the contract. This conclusion is helped by the fact that
the first two words in sentence two, namely “such damages,” are to be
interpreted as meaning the damages as fixed in the contract. There is no other
solution possible, as sentence one is not operative anymore due to Article 6.
It must be remembered that any court will always look at the contract first and
only if the contract is silent on an issue will the CISG be consulted. It is
argued, therefore, that the inclusion of a fixed sum in effect varies part of
Article 74; the limit of damages is not set by Article 74 but by the contractual
clause.
Another situation needs to be analysed: where the fixed sum is equal to
the loss when the contract was formed, but when the contract is breached the
actual damages are far less then the fixed sum and arguably a party might now
contend that the damages amount to a penalty. It is uncontested that at the
formation of the contract, Article 4 is not applicable as the fixed sum is not
schlechtriem.html#a18 (citing ULIS Article 74(2)).
16. Graves, supra note 1, at 161.
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penal in nature. The question is: when is Article 4 enlivened? It is clear that
at the formation stage the CISG governs the objective requirement; that is the
external consensus. But concerning issues of validity of the contract, the
internal consensuses are “with few exceptions explicitly excluded from the
domain of the Convention.”  It is also recognised that any deviation from the17
convention by Article 6 is subject to the “validity check” of Article 4.  The18
most common issues of validity concern matters of mistake, fraud and
illegality. All of these issues arguably are discoverable at the formation stage
and not when the contract is breached. Arguably, therefore, in relation to the
inclusion of a fixed sum, validity is not an issue at the formation stage and
hence Article 6 is the “master” of the contract and therefore “the interpretation
of ‘validity’ is not initially a question of domestic law.”19
Professor Graves argued, at least by implication, that the relevant point
of inquiry is at the time of the breach of the contract as the clause has now
become invalid, hence domestic law will resolve the issue. However, this view
does not take Article 8 or Article 74 into consideration. Article 74 clearly
notes that the damages must have been foreseen or ought to have been
foreseen by the breaching party at the time of the conclusion of the contract.20
Article 8 backs up Article 74 as the conduct of the parties—in this case
agreeing on fixed sum—must be interpreted “according to the understanding
that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had
in the same circumstances.”  Article 74 by these very words focuses on21
knowledge at the time when the contract is concluded and not when it is
breached, hence Article 4 is not enlivened.
The conclusion is that a functionally equivalent principle has been created
and to extend the validity issue from the “internal consensus” to the “external
consensus” is to be rejected, as it is not within the sphere of influence of
Article 4. Simply put, the question of validity needs to be asked at the
formation stage and not when the contract is breached.
The argument that the formation stage is the crucial point when the
validity issue needs to be determined is strengthened when the allocation of
risk is investigated. It is argued that in general—and specifically in this
case—the amount of damages in cases of breach and the risk of payment of
a fixed sum rests with the party who accepts the terms. In the absence of
17. Djordjevic, supra note 5, at 65.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. CISG art. 74.
21. CISG art. 8(2).
180 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 30:173
contractual limitations, it has to be established that at the time when the
contract was formed, the party who has taken the risk could have controlled
the event that resulted in the breach. Hence, a party breaching a contract does
so with perfect knowledge of how much the costs of the breach are.
If, on the other hand, the breaching party couldn’t have controlled the
event which made the performance of the contract impossible, the breaching
party can rely on Article 79. A Belgian court noted:
The Commercial Court of Hasselt has ruled that changes in prices are foreseeable and do
not exempt the parties from performance of their obligations. The court stated, moreover,
that the performance of the obligation in such a case would imply a financial loss, but
that this did not prevent the performance of the agreement. The conclusion of a contract
that is not lucrative or that is even a losing proposition is part of the risks that belong to
commercial activities . . . .22
The question of risk—in this case the cost of breaching the contract—is
important because in reality it is only the party who assumed the risk that has
an interest and the ability to control the risk. Schlechtriem stated that:
It is a question of an allocation of risk of damages based on economic reasons and not
only on the basis of control over the sphere in which damages could arise.23
The conclusion is that:
CISG art. 79 does not entitle the promisor to be released from his contractual obligations
due to change of the economic background on which the parties relied for the conclusion
of the contract.24
If that is the case, then it can be argued that a fixed sum is a change of the
economic background on which the parties relied and hence the measurement
of risk and its allocation is taking place at the conclusion of the contract and
not at the time of the breach. Therefore all foreseeable consequences of a
breach such as the payment of a fixed sum fall under the risk of the breaching
party. Only those risks that could not have been reasonably anticipated fall
22. Rechtbank van Koophandel Tongeren [District Court of Tongeren] Belgium, 25 Jan. 2005,
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050125b1.html.
23. Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law in the Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof, in 50 YEARS
OF THE BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [FEDERAL SUPREME COURT OF GERMANY]: A CELEBRATION ANTHOLOGY
FROM THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY (Todd J. Fox trans., 2001), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/biblio/schlechtriem3.html.
24. Efeteria Lamias [Court of Appeals of Lamia] Greece, 2006, available at http://cisgw3.law
.pace.edu/cases/060001gr.html.
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under Article 79, which certainly are not the cost associated with a breach of
a contract. It is therefore obvious that the question of risk and particularly
what type of risk needs to be understood. The Federal Supreme Court of
Germany clarified the situation by stating:
The possibility of exemption under CISG Art. 79 does not change the allocation of the
contractual risk. . . . [and upon breach needs to pay damages which are already fixed in
the contract].25
Arguably, therefore, as the risk has passed irrespective whether the fixed
sum is under, at or even possibly above the actual damages under an Article
79 exemption, the fixed sum cannot be claimed. In sum, the two situations
where a breach occurs damages are still possible, but under Article 79—as it
is an exemption—the damages are quarantined.
So far it has been demonstrated that a fixed sum that is not greater than
the actual damages can be enforced. This proposition appears to be accepted
in all legal systems and can be accommodated within the CISG. If the fixed
sum is the same as the damages when the contract has been concluded, but
turns out to be greater at the breach, such a sum can still be enforced, because
the critical point when the validity issues must be decided is at the formation
stage of the contract and not at the breach.
This conclusion is certainly strengthened when looking at Article 79,
which clearly notes that the exemption is judged on facts that were known at
the time of the conclusion of the contract. Article 79 only quarantines
damages that are due to an impediment and therefore not known at the
conclusion of the contract. This does not include the fixed sum that was
known at the conclusion of the contract.
The most important point is that the focus to establish a “functionally
adequate solution” is when the contract is formed and not when it is breached.
The outcome is that Article 4 is not applicable.
SECOND ARGUMENT
The real problem arises when the fixed sum is judged to exceed the actual
damages at the conclusion of the contract. Two possible issues can arise: first,
the parties are not aware of it and second, the parties are aware that the fixed
sum is in fact a penalty clause. Because the fixed sum is greater than the loss,
25. Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Supreme Court] Germany, 24 Mar. 1999, available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990324g1.html.
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the question of validity is enlivened and hence, as Professor Graves might
argue, the penalty clause is deemed to be invalid and hence is excluded from
the CISG. As pointed out above, any fixed sum must be interpreted at the
formation stage of a contract and hence that is also the point where logically
the question of validity should be judged. In order to assist in ascertaining the
parties’ intentions, Article 8 is of help and logically if the parties knew or
ought to have known that the fixed sum is penal in nature, the issue of validity
must now be considered.
Professor Graves has argued that when the fixed sum is a penalty clause
and the parties are aware of this the issue is clear. Article 74 and 8 point to the
fact that Article 4 is now enlivened. It is therefore clear that Article 6 is
subject to the validity check and in this case the penalty clause is deemed to
be invalid.
Of all the possible cases, this is arguably the only situation where the
application of Article 4 is arguably possible specifically when both parties
were aware that the fixed sum is penal in nature.
In this case a complex situation arises. First, Article 7 mandates
uniformity. Fixed sums that turn out to be penal in nature are enforced in civil
law countries and not are not generally enforced in common law countries.
Also, following the above argument, a fixed sum which turns out to be penal
only at the breach and not at the formation stage, must not be enforced; the
result is that no uniformity is achieved.
The second issue is that Article 6 allows for derivation and Article 8
invites the courts to investigate the intent of the parties, which in these cases
shows that they are willingly and knowingly entering into a contract where a
clause is penal in nature. It is now that Article 4, despite the above principles,
changes an otherwise agreed bargain by domestic interference. Looking at the
totality of principles within the CISG, it would appear that a further general
principle can be constructed, namely the principle that fixed sums are what
they are meant to be, a re-calculation of damages, negating at least part of
Article 74, namely sentence one and hence a contractual obligation founded
within the four corners of the CISG. The question is why a court should
reward a party, which by their own free will entered into a bargain that in the
end proved to be economically not advantageous. Considering that hardship
is not within the CISG, it could be argued that a penal sum falls under the
principle of hardship and hence a court should enforce a contractual bargain
and apply the spirit of the CISG and not the technical application of one
article. The “mercantile” rather than a “promissory” perspective ought to
direct courts and tribunals to read the CISG within its four corners and the
weight of principles pointing to the fact that a bargain must be upheld is an
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overwhelming one and a fixed sum is a fixed sum and should be judged a
calculation of “real damages” and the actual amount of the fixed sum is
irrelevant. The parties have decided what the real costs of a breach are and
such a decision must be enforced. Furthermore, it can be argued that the CISG
has no promissory principles that are applicable when determining damages.
CONCLUSION
It is uncontested that, as clearly noted in sentence one, Article 4 “governs
only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the
seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”  It follows therefore that26
the contract or any clauses in a contract that are invalid ab initio under any
domestic law must be evaluated taking the particular domestic laws into
consideration and not the CISG. As Professor Graves correctly noted they
include issues such as illegality.  It is therefore argued that the formation of27
the contract is the determinative point in time where the decision needs to be
made whether Article 4 is applicable. However, where there is a functionally
equivalent principle or provision within the CISG, Article 4 does not apply.
It is argued that if at the formation of the contract a functionally equivalent
principle can be found, Article 4 cannot be invoked. Simply put, the point of
assessment is not the point where the breach occurred, but at the time the
contract was formed.
It has been argued that the starting and finishing points for any argument
is the formation of a contract. The promises made at the formation of the
contract should be paramount and any other intervening events, such a breach
of a contract, must be judged by the original contract with a view that the
parties entered into a contract willingly knowing the consequences of any non-
performance. As an observation, a party entering into a contract willingly and
knowingly signing the contract and understanding that a penalty clause is
embedded in the contract can later escape the clause claiming invalidity of the
term.
It is argued that the aggrieved party is now disadvantaged and without
redress except claiming the damages as calculated at the breach of the contract
by the court or tribunal. Graves correctly understands that the argument in
effect uses the “functional equivalent test” as the term is used in Article 4. He
goes on to argue that using Article 74 amounts “to the use of the ‘tail’
26. CISG art. 4.
27. Graves, supra note 1, at 157.
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(foreseeability) to ‘wag the dog’ (compensation for the aggrieved party’s
expectation damages). Instead one should begin any analysis of Article 74
with its first sentence.”28
This indeed is a good argument, however, the real question is: how is
Article 6 interpreted? The article clearly indicates that a party can either
derogate from any provision, but most importantly it can also vary the effects
of any of its provisions. By varying a provision—in this case Article 74—the
parties varied the effect of Article 74 namely excluding sentence one. The
parties in effect have stated that the damages are capped by the stated fixed
sum and not by the “sum equal to the loss.”  If Article 6 would not be able to29
vary the effect of Article 74, then the argument of Graves that the awarding
of “punitive damages in excess of a party’s actual loss is contrary to the basic
principle of Article 74” would be correct. However, Article 6 has changed the
effects of Article 74, which still mandates that the losses must have been
foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract and most importantly the
breaching party must have known the possible consequences of the breach.
The stipulation that facts must be known or foreseen at the conclusion of the
contract is not unique to Article 74. It can also be found as an example in
Article 79.
In sum, a court should view a fixed sum as a predetermined amount of
damages payable in cases of a breach of contract. The fact that in some cases
the amount might exceed actual damages is of no consequence and is not
subject to the validity issue. The fixing of a sum is a calculation of damages
which the parties knew or ought to have know when the formed the contract.
Perhaps the last word should belong to Peter Schlechtriem who noted:
Article 6 guarantees party autonomy over both the conflict rules and the substantive law;
[thus], any rule of the Convention can be altered or rejected by the parties, even by
standard contract terms  . . . [and importantly] the underlying idea is that the parties, at30
the conclusion of the contract, should be able to calculate the risks and potential liability
they assume by their agreement.31
28. Id. at 161.
29. CISG art. 74.
30. Schlecthriem, supra note 15, at 34.
31. Id. at 96.
